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THE QUALITY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE
CURSE OF NATURAL RESOURCES*
Antonio Cabrales and Esther Hauk
We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural
resources, which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard
voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction
that policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might
lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. It also suggests that for bad political
institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high institutional
quality the dependence is reversed. This finding is corroborated in cross section regressions.
Until World War II the economics profession tended to believe that natural resources
were an unqualified blessing for the nation that owned them. However, in the post
World-War II period, the evidence against this belief started accumulating: many
resource rich countries grew very slowly and economists started to talk about the curse
of natural resources. There is a large number of empirical papers which find evidence
of this curse (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001; Strauss, 2000; Gylfason, 2004;
Mehlum et al., 2006). Some authors (Sala-i-Martin, 1997 and Doppelhofer et al., 2000)
have even classified natural resources as one of the ten most robust variables with a
significantly negative effect on growth in empirical studies.
To summarise, there seems to be an empirical consensus on the following:
Fact 1. The curse of natural resources: countries rich in natural resources grow slower on
average than natural resource poor countries.
However, there are many important outliers. Some resource rich countries have
grown very fast (e.g., Botswana,1 Canada, Australia, Norway) while others have grown
very slowly (e.g., Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela).2 It
seems fair to claim that:
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1 Acemoglu et al. (2003) show that Botswana has the highest per capita growth of any country in the world
in the last 35 years. The natural resources of Botswana are diamonds. This country had very bad starting
conditions for growth (extremely low education levels, bad infrastructure etc.) but good’ institutions.
2 Some countries which have been fairly rich in resources in 1970 that grew rapidly in the next 20 years are
Malaysia, Mauritius and Iceland (Sachs and Warner, 2001). Gylfason (2001) additionally lists Indonesia and
Thailand as countries attaining both long term investment exceeding 25% GDP and per capita GNP growth
exceeding 4% per year on average from 1970 to 1998. Also the so called Scandinavian catch up in the late
nineteenth century was based on natural resources.
Fact 2. The cross country evidence is inconsistent with a monotonic effect of resources on
development/growth: (Robinson et al., 2006)
We therefore need to understand when natural resources are a blessing and when
they are a curse. The empirical literature has taken a step in this direction and it
defines policy failure as the prime cause of the underperformance of resource rich
countries. It also points to a reason why these policy failures occur. Namely:
Fact 3. The quality of institutions is decisive in determining whether natural resources are a
blessing or a curse.3
Institutions are linked to the behaviour of politicians, as they limit their discretion
and define the policy space. The quality of institutions is also indicative of the level of
democracy of a country. More democratic countries tend to have better institutions and
are therefore less likely to be cursed by natural resources. But empirical findings also
suggest a reverse causality known as the political Dutch disease:4
Fact 4. Natural resources have anti democratic properties: oil and mineral wealth tends
to make states less democratic (Ross, 2001; Lam and Wantchekon, 2002; Jensen and
Wantchekon, 2004; Bulte and Damania, 2008).
Moreover, in countries with weak institutions natural resources are one of the main
sources of civil war and revolution.
Fact 5. Many revolutions are linked to rents derived from natural resources (Collier and
Hoeffler, 1998). In particular, oil, gemstones, minerals and other lootable resources are asso
ciated with civil conflict while agriculture is not.5
The theoretical contribution of the present article is threefold:
(1) We propose the first theoretical model that incorporates and explains the five
empirical facts outlined above.
(2) We present an explicitly political model which emphasises the behaviour and
incentives of politicians. This is key, since there is a clear understanding that
the behaviour of government/politicians is fundamental to explain the eco-
nomic performance in resource abundant countries (Newberry, 1986,
p. 334).
3 Mehlum et al. (2006) show that the effect of resources on growth is positive (negative) when institutions
are good (bad) using Sachs and Warner’s (1995) data. The same paper, as well as Boschini et al. (2007), shows
that the direct negative effect is stronger for minerals than other resources and institutions are more decisive
for the effect of minerals than other resources.
4 The usual argument explaining why natural resources harm democratisation is based on the incumbent’s
discretion over the distribution of natural resources. A noticeable exception is Morrison (2007) who argues
that even in an ideal scenario where natural resources are funnelled away from non democratic governments
toward the citizens, natural resources would still hinder democratisation. His model is based on Acemoglu
and Robinson’s (2006) theory of democratisation in which the distributional struggle between the poor and
the rich is a reason for democratisation. Morrison shows that natural resources reduce the need for redis
tribution by the rich: if the natural resource revenue is high enough, the poor may no longer prefer a positive
tax rate.
5 For an overview on the empirical literature on the link between civil unrest and natural resources see Ross
(2004).
(3) We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond
the elections. Democratic institutions are often imperfect and electoral
competition could be weak. But in our model, as in reality, citizens have
instruments in addition to elections that allow them to avoid policies which
could cause them big welfare losses. We introduce these considerations in the
model by assuming that citizens can initiate a revolution.6 This gives rise to a
new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give
rise to a revolution. We will refer to this new constraint as the no revolution
constraint.
The existing theoretical literature concentrates mainly on explaining the curse’7
(Fact 1)8 and suggests ways to avoid it.9 This line of research ignores the role of
government and therefore cannot explain why governments do not choose the good
policies in the first place.10 We need explicitly political models to understand when
natural resources are a blessing and when they are a curse.
To our knowledge the first explicitly political model in this area was developed by
Robinson et al. (2006). Their model explains empirical Facts 2 and 3. In their article
there are two periods, with elections at the end of the first period. In the first
period, natural resources are discovered. The incumbent government has to decide
which proportion of the resources to extract immediately and how much to leave
for the following period. The government can consume the resource income, or use
it to influence election outcomes by offering employment in the public sector,
which is relatively inefficient. The main result of the article is that politicians tend
to overextract resources in the first period because they only care about the future
resources if they remain in power. Moreover, the public sector will be inefficiently
large. Institutions are decisive for the overall impact of resource booms because they
determine the extent to which political incentives can really influence policy out-
comes.
While the size of the public sector and the extraction path of natural resources are
clearly relevant issues, there are other important channels from natural resources to
growth that are unexplored by Robinson et al. (2006); in particular, human capital
accumulation or education. One danger of natural resources (Gylfason, 2001) is the
neglect of education, since the country can live well over an extended period even with
6 It need not be violent, although we will assume it causes some economic disruption. General strikes are
an example of voters’ control beyond the elections.
7 For a list of explanations for the natural resource trap and their empirical support, see Strauss (2000).
8 There is no generally accepted explanation for the curse so far. The one with maybe most empirical
support is the Dutch disease’ explanation which goes as follows: the discovery and exploitations of natural
resources like oil typically leads to large profits. These profits encourage entry into the industry at the expense
of other sectors, expand national income and increase demand with a resulting inflationary pressure. At the
same time more foreign currency enters the country which appreciates the real exchange rate. Export profits
in the non boom sector fall sharply which attracts even more capacity into the boom sector. The long run
results once the boom is over are stagflation and an over valued real exchange rate.
The Dutch disease is preventable by good policies; e.g. Indonesia avoided the disease after its oil discovery
by consistently devaluing its currency.
9 See, e.g., Birdsall et al. (2000).
10 Rent seeking and corruption are explanations that have been put forward. In these models the state is an
aggregator of pressure from interest groups (Becker Olson approach) which as Robinson et al. (2006)
pointed out ignores incentives of politicians who often have a large amount of autonomy from interest
groups.
a weak commitment to education. But since we know that increased education is
conducive to higher growth levels (Barro, 2001; Barro and Lee, 2001; Gylfason and
Zoega, 2004), this reduced commitment to education will cost those countries in terms
of long-run growth. For this reason, it is difficult to explain the higher persistence of
growth in resource-rich Scandinavia than in Latin America (especially resource-rich
countries such as Argentina and Chile) without remarking on the educational gap that
emerged between the two groups of countries over the period 1870–1910 and which
remained large throughout the twentieth century (Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio,
2002).
In this article we build an explicitly political model to explain when natural resource
discoveries lead to higher or lower education levels. We are only interested in publicly
owned resources,11 such as oil, gas and minerals.12 Politicians are purely self-interested
and would like to consume the returns from the resource wealth themselves but
political pressure obliges them to redistribute at least a part of it to voters. This
redistribution can take the form of:
(i) a direct transfer or
(ii) a subsidy for the investment in human capital, which has a positive spillover on
the entire population.
The incumbent government faces political pressure from two sources: an election
and the possibility of a revolution. We model political opposition by the existence of a
competitive fringe. Additionally, we assume that political transitions are not without
costs. These costs depend on the quality and transparency of political institutions and
the level of human capital of the fringe players. The efficiency of the fringe increases in
human capital. For low levels of education the fringe will always be less efficient than
the incumbent at managing natural resources. Whether or not this situation can be
reversed for highly educated fringe players crucially depends on the quality of political
institutions. Hence, the function characterising the efficiency of the fringe players gives
us a measure for institutional quality.13
Besides the political competition there is always a possibility of a revolution. If the
revolution is successful, natural resources fall into the hands of the voters who divide
the gains equally among themselves. These gains now depend on the management
11 Bulte and Damania (2008) present an explicitly political model in which resources are not publicly
owned. In the resource sector entrepreneurs claim a fraction of the resource stock and extract from their
private sub stock. In their model entrepreneurs decide whether to enter resource extraction which has
diminishing returns or manufacturing which has increasing returns. Hence moving into manufacturing yields
external benefits. Production in both sectors requires a sector specific semi public good provided by a purely
self interested government. To get this good the sectors offer payments/bribes to the government, who
decides how much of the good to produce in return. The government might be challenged by a political
opponent. The manufacturing sector bribes too little and hence gets too little of the sector specific good,
since firms do not internalise the spill over benefits from production. As in our article, the stronger the
potential rival, the more the incumbent government has to take welfare maximising considerations into
account to remain in power. As a result the resource curse emerges if there is no credible opposition or
political transaction costs are high. With strong political competition the government cannot stray far from
the income maximising path and hence resource booms are not detrimental for growth.
12 In all petrostates the government maintains explicit legal ownership of below ground reserves irre
spective of surface property rights; see footnote 12 in Lam and Wantchekon (2002). Most OPEC governments
put the resources under national control in particular in the 1960s and 1970s.
13 This assumption will be justified at length in the next Section.
skills of voters. We assume that voters are better at managing natural resources the
higher their level of education.
We establish the following main results:
(1) If the fringe wins the election, human capital increases with the amount of
natural resources.
(2) If the government wins the election, human capital is a non-increasing function
of natural resources.
(3) If the government does not have to worry about revolution, human capital is
constant.
(4) If revolution is a binding constraint, human capital decreases in natural
resources.
(5) Revolution is less likely to be a threat, the better are a country’s political
institution.
(6) The probability that the incumbent is re-elected may increase with natural
resources and this is more likely for countries with bad institutions.
These results confirm that our explicitly political model captures the five empirical
facts mentioned above. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to
revolutions (Fact 5), namely, in countries with weak institutions. In our model, nat-
ural resources may be bad for democracy because they can harm political turnover
(Fact 4). Our model suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural
resources (Fact 2). For low levels of institutional quality human capital depends
negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of institutional quality the
dependence is reversed (Fact 3). Since natural resources are bad when the govern-
ment wins the election and this probability may increase with natural resources,
especially in countries with bad institutions, natural resources are a curse on average
(Fact 1).
Empirical Facts 1 to 3 were stated in terms of growth. We do not model growth
directly but use human capital/education instead, which is an established engine of
growth (Barro, 2001). An explicitly dynamic model would allow study, for example, of
the dynamics of capital accumulation, at the expense of a considerable complication
in its exposition and development. Our model allows us to explain the empirical facts
already discussed as arising from the effects of education on growth. In addition, our
model yields direct predictions for the effect of natural resources on education,
which can then be tested empirically. Existing empirical studies report conflicting
results of the effect of natural resources on education.14 The most complete study is
the one by Stijns (2004), who discusses the different indicators used for resource
abundance and human capital accumulation and shows that the conclusion on the
link between these two is sensitive to the indicators chosen. Simple correlation
coefficients and regressions switch from positive to negative depending on which
resource abundance and which human capital indicator is used. This evidence might
14 Gylfason (2001; 2004) establishes an inverse relationship of human capital measured as public expen
diture on education, expected years of schooling for girls and gross secondary school enrollment with the
share of natural capital in national wealth. However, the results seem to be driven by very few countries.
be consistent with the non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources
predicted in our model. We provide preliminary evidence for this model prediction
in OLS regressions where we split the sample into two groups, namely countries with
good institutions and bad institutions.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the model
and solves it. Section 2 discusses the empirical implication of the model and presents
some preliminary evidence. Section 3 concludes.
1. The Model
Assume a country owns a stock of natural resources that generates some rents.
These resources are publicly owned and will therefore be managed by politicians.
Politicians are motivated solely by self-interest, hence the government would like to
keep the rents from the resources for itself but it will only be able to benefit from
the resource discovery if it remains in power. There are two potential threats for
the government’s power: an upcoming election and the possibility of a revolution.
Before the election the different political parties propose a contract to voters. The
contract consists of a direct money transfer to voters and a per unit subsidy for
human capital accumulation. Then the election takes place. Once the election
outcome is known, investment in human capital is made. The contract proposed by
the winning party will be implemented unless voters decide to instigate a revolution
and the revolution is successful. A successful revolution means that citizens grab the
natural resources and split the rents equally among themselves. Revolution also
influences productivity in the private sector. We now describe the different steps in
detail. We start with the electoral process.
In the elections, the government G faces the opposition of a competitive fringe. In
other words, the opposition consists of several parties that compete among them-
selves. The unique policy issue is how to distribute the rents generated by the natural
resource. We assume that the value of the resource rents depends on the winner of
the elections: its value will be W if managed by the incumbent government and d(e)W
if managed by one of the fringe parties, where e stands for human capital and
d(e)  0 for all e. Furthermore, we assume that d(0) ¼ d < 1 and d0(e) > 0, i.e. for
low levels of education the fringe is always less efficient than the government at
managing natural resources but the competence of the fringe increases with human
capital. The underlying idea of this assumption is that political transitions may
handicap non-incumbent politicians. The incumbent party can obtain some advan-
tages from being in government. For example, the whole apparatus of the state can
be used by elected officials of this party to access information and other resources.15
In addition, the incumbent politicians may become more able over time by a simple
learning by doing process.16 The size of the incumbency advantage depends on the
quality of the political institutions. In some countries, basic institutions work inde-
pendently of who is in office, while in other places even secretarial jobs depend on
15 See, e.g. Cox and Katz (1996), who document empirically the sources of incumbency advantage.
16 Padro i Miquel and Snyder (2006) demonstrate that legislators’ Effectiveness never declines with ten
ure, even out to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective
retirement, but appears to be due to learning by doing.’
the party in power. In the latter case, which is also known as the spoils system’, a
change in government implies new workers in key jobs, which obviously leads to
severe inefficiencies. A lot of information has to be rediscovered, many things have to
be learned again.17
We assume that the incumbent’s advantage in the management of natural
resources depends on the human capital of the new workers and on the transpar-
ency of institutions. With higher human capital and transparency it is harder to hide
existing information to the newcomers in power. Hence, our function d(e) measures
the costs of political transitions18 and summarises the quality of a country’s political
institutions.19 The better the institutions in a country, the better is the political
competitive fringe at managing natural resources,20 which for simplicity is the only
task of politicians in our model. While our argument is more general (and it should
be thought of in these general terms), the quality of institutions also affects the
resource sector directly. In some countries, this sector is generally independent of
the incumbent government, because resource extraction is handled by privately-
owned multinational corporations, but there are other countries in which the firms
are state-owned and employment in these firms might be subject to changes in
government.21
There are two ways to transfer resource rents to voters,
(i) via a direct (per capita) transfer w and
(ii) via a per unit subsidy p for the investment in human capital.
17 Jonas and Jones (1956) cite arguments from the earliest study of turnover of state personnel by Professor
Martin L. Faust against the spoils system.
The spoils system entails heavy turnover in personnel which periodically results in the scrapping of all or
nearly all accumulated experience. It places inexperienced and incompetent persons in responsible
administrative positions. Since it is predicated upon rewards and favours, it introduces favouritism and
partiality in the conduct of the public business and limits the access to the public service of young people of
capacity and promise. The spoils system renders impossible continuity in administrative policy and destroys
morale within the service. It leads to oligarchy and autocracy by helping bosses get control of the party
machinery.‘‘ Moreover, the prevalence of the spoils system in state government makes difficult effective
federal state co operation and at the same time encourages the growth of bureaucracy at both levels.’ ( Jonas
and Jones, 1956, p.755)
18 Notice that we do not exclude the possibility that the fringe might become more efficient than the
government at managing natural resources: if political institutions are good d(1) > 1 but for countries with
bad political institutions there will always be an efficiency loss. In this countries d will be very bounded and
low, i.e. d(1) << 1.
19 An alternative interpretation of the d(e) function is that it captures the cost for the opposition to get
access to power. In countries with worse institutions, the costs for the opposition to reach power are higher. It
will then use part of the resource wealth to recover those costs once in power.
20 To understand our assumption fully it will be useful to comment on what would happen in a dynamic
extension of the model after a change in government. If the opposition wins, today’s incumbent party
becomes part of tomorrow’s opposition and today’s fringe becomes the new incumbent. We argue that we can
use the same assumptions about relative efficiency of (new) fringe and incumbent as in the static model. The
old fringe party is now an incumbent and has gathered experience on making the institutions function with
his team. He has privileged information and the incumbency advantage. The former incumbent (the new
fringe player) does not keep his former efficiency advantage which was linked to his former superior infor
mation and some control over political institutions through their key workers. If he wins again, he will have to
become familiar with the changes introduced by the opponent, and might need to replace key players who
need to gain experience since the institutions evolved.
21 PeMex (Petroleos Mexico) is an example of a state owned firm in which employment depends on the
party in power: Arellano Gault and Klinger (2004) refer to PeMEX as a politically sensitive agency.
The individual’s level of human capital e together with the average level of human
capital e and the past level of human capital ep determine each individual’s marginal
productivity (salary) x in the following way (where we assume a þb < 1):
x ¼ kðe eP Þaðe eP Þb:
Hence past level of human capital matters and there is a positive externality (spillover)
for society as a whole if an individual invests in human capital. We justify/microfound
our choice that past human capital enters in a multiplicative form in Appendix B. We
assume that the monetary cost of acquiring a unit of human capital is k. Given the
promised transfers, the voter decides on his own level of human capital by maximising
his utility. Hence, the program of the voter is:
max
e
U ½w þ kðe eP Þaðe eP Þb  ðk pÞe: ð1Þ
The first order conditions of this (concave) problem yield kp ¼ akeP(e eP)a 1(e eP)b.
Since all voters are identical we can assume that in equilibrium e ¼ e and eP ¼ eP.
Therefore
k p ¼ ajeaþb 1; ð2Þ
where j ¼ keaþbP . Notice that with this definition j incorporates all predetermined
human capital. Hence, j will be higher when human capital depreciates at a slower rate,
or when a country has a larger level of development when discovering natural resources.
We will refer to (2) as the voter’s incentive compatibility constraint: it tells us the level
of human capital of a voter given the size of the subsidy p. Using this constraint, we can
talk directly about the level of human capital e resulting from the transfers instead of
discussing the size of the subsidy p. Hence voter’s material utility can be rewritten as a
function of the direct transfer w and the level of human capital e, namely
U ½w þ jð1 aÞeaþb: ð3Þ
There is a continuum of voters with total mass n. Voters care about the promised
utility by the competing parties but also have some ideological concerns. The fringe
parties are perceived by voters as ideologically equivalent, hence we can assume that the
equilibrium behaviour of fringe players will be identical (we focus on a symmetric
equilibrium). From now on, all endogenous variables will be indexed by the political
actor offering them. Thus, we have xi, wi, ei, ei, pi with i 2 fG, Fg where G stands for
Government’ and F for Fringe’.
The electoral process is a version of the probabilistic voting model and works in the
following way:
Voters are located in the interval [0,1]. The utility of a voter v 2 ½0,1] when offered
a policy that delivers material’ utility UG from the government is denoted
uðv;UG Þ ¼ UG  hv:
The utility of a voter v 2 ½0,1] when offered a policy that delivers material’ utility UF
from the competitive fringe is denoted
uðv;UF Þ ¼ UF  hð1 vÞ;
where h denotes the strength of purely ideological concerns.
In addition, in every election there is an unexpected aggregate shock’ eU [A,A]
to the utility that shifts preferences of all the voters in favour or against the incumbent.
We add this shock to the preferences toward the incumbent. uðv;UG Þ þ e: The pro-
portion of voters preferring G over F is then:
min max 0;
1
2
þ UG  UF
2h
þ e
2h
 
; 1
 
:
Thus, the ex ante probability that the incumbent wins the election, given promises UF,
UG is:
22
Pr min max 0;
1
2
þ UG  UF
2h
þ e
2h
 
; 1
 
 1
2
 
:
Hence, the incumbent wins for all e > e1, where e1 makes
1
2
þ UG  UF
2h
þ e1
2h
¼ 1
2
:
Thus, e1 ¼ (UGUF). The probability of winning for the incumbent is equal to
Pr½e > e1 ¼ ðUG  UF Þ ¼ min max 0;A  e1
2A
 
; 1
 
ð4Þ
¼ min max 0; 1
2
þ UG  UF
2A
 
; 1
 
: ð5Þ
The incumbent cannot win if 12þ ½ðUG  UF Þ=2A < 0; which implies that
A < (UG  UF). On the other hand, the incumbent wins with probability 1 for
A < (UG  UF).
After the election results, the citizens decide whether or not to take part in a revo-
lution.23 If a revolution takes place, it happens after the acquisition of human capital.
We assume that a revolution is costly (its cost for each participant is c)24 and it is
successful with probability q. In the case of a successful revolution, the citizens manage
the natural resources and obtain an equal split of the resource rents.25 We assume that
a revolutionary government will affect both the returns from natural resources and the
22 Here we make the assumption that half of the votes are necessary to win the election. By lowering the
proportion of votes necessary to stay in power we could reproduce any democratic form of government and
even a dictatorship since any dictator will require a minimal support to stay in power. These lower values
would not change the qualitative results of the paper.
23 We think of a revolution as a threshold public good problem. It can be successful only when at least x
people revolt. This modelling choice leaves open the question of the revolutionaries’ identities. In our model
there is a natural candidate: the group of voters ideologically most distinct from the winning party.
24 This parameter is meant to capture all costs that occur because there is a revolution whether or not it is
successful and it is assumed to be constant for simplicity. This cost can include forgone production during
revolution and actual fighting costs.
25 In other words, we assume that the revolutionaries are fair’ because resource rents are split among all
citizens. By not allowing revolutionaries to steal from the people, we sidestep the potential infinite regress
problem of revolution against the revolutionaries themselves. In any case, it would be easy to handle formally
other ways to share resources after a revolution. For example, assume resources were shared only among the x
people who actually revolt. The only change needed in the model would be to replace the R(W/n) function
defined below by R(W/x). This would entail no qualitative changes in our results, as it would simply make the
constraint more likely to bind, like an increase in q or a decrease in c.
productivity in the private sector and that (similarly to the fringe politicians) the
management skills of revolutionaries increase with human capital. This is described by
the function c(e) with c 0(e) > 0.26 If the revolution fails, the original contract proposed
by the winner of the elections is imposed. Before analysing the model further we
summarise the timing of the model.
Timing of the model
(1) Resource discovery.
(2) The incumbent and the fringe opposition offer contracts (w,p) to voters.
(3) Nature chooses the aggregate preference shock toward the incumbent.
(4) Voting takes place.
(5) The election outcome becomes known and human capital is acquired.
(6 ) Citizens decide whether or not to participate in a revolution.
(7) If not enough people participate in a revolution, the contract proposed by the
winning party is implemented. If enough people participate in a revolution,
nature determines whether or not it is successful (probability q).
 If successful, citizens manage the natural resources themselves and divide the
rents equally among themselves. The management skills of revolutionaries
affect both the returns to natural resources and the productivity of the pri-
vate sector. There are no subsidies to human capital accumulation, so when
production restarts after the revolution, citizens have to pay for the entire
costs of extra human capital accumulation and their choice determines the
postrevolutionary human capital eR.
 If the revolution fails, the original contract of the election winner is imposed.
Given these assumptions, political parties want to avoid the revolution. The no revo
lution constraint requires that the promised contracts have to be at least as good as the
outcome of the revolution, i.e.
U ½wþ jð1 aÞeaþb  qU fcðeÞ½W =nþ jð1 aÞeaþbR g þ ð1 qÞU ½wþ jð1 aÞeaþb  c;
where eR is determined by the solution to the problem (1) defined earlier on with
p ¼ 0. Since c(e) is predetermined by the human capital choice before the revolution,
it is a constant from the point of view of revolutionaries, and hence the first order
condition determining eR is akeP ðeR eP Þa 1 eRePð Þb¼ k; where eR is the average level of
human capital after a successful revolution which in equilibrium (since everybody is
identical) is eR. So k¼ ajeaþb 1R and eR ¼ ðaj=kÞ
1
1 a b: So therefore we can write
W =n þ jð1 aÞeaþbR ¼ RðW =nÞ:
Notice that R 0(W/n) ¼ 1. The no revolution constraint simplifies to:
26 It is very likely that after a revolution citizens who manage the natural resources themselves do not
entirely rely on former experts. This is captured by the c(e) function that parallels the d(e) function. Alter
natively, we could assume that the management skills for natural resources of revolutionaries are independent
from natural resources, but the more educated they are, the lower the cost of revolution or the higher the
probability of success.
U ½w þ jð1 aÞeaþb  U ½cðeÞRðW =nÞ  c
q
:
We first observe that:
Lemma 1. Revolution is a potential threat only to the incumbent government.
Proof. First notice that competition among the fringe players drives their profits down
to zero. The equilibrium offer by the fringe can thus be obtained by maximising the
consumers’ utility subject to the resource constraint (what we call the fringe pro-
gramme). To see why in equilibrium the fringe does not take the no-revolution con-
straint into account, suppose that the solution to the above described fringe
programme (call it Programme 1) does not satisfy the no-revolution constraint (the
only problematic case). Then one could obtain an alternative solution by imposing the
constraint (call this the solution to Programme 2). But the solution to Programme 2
can only decrease the utility of agents (with respect to the solution of Programme 1),
which can only worsen the constraint, leading to a contradiction. The government, on
the other hand, does keep some of the resource rents for itself. Therefore revolution
might be a threat for the government.
We will now formally state the maximisation problems of the fringe players and of the
government.
1.1. The Fringe Problem
Due to competition among fringe players, the fringe maximises the consumers’ utility
subject to the resource constraint d(eF)W/nwF pF eF  0. Using the incentive com-
patibility constraint of voters (2), the resource constraint can be rewritten as
dðeF ÞW =n  wF  keF þ ajeaþbF  0 and we can talk about the fringe choosing eF
instead of pF. Hence the fringe problem is:
27
maxeF ;wF U ½wF þ jð1 aÞeaþbF 
subject to
dðeF ÞW =n  wF  keF þ jeaþbF  0:
Since there is competition among fringe players, the resource constraint has to be
satisfied with equality, therefore the fringe problem becomes:
maxeF ;wF U ½dðeF ÞW =n  keF þ jeaþbF :
The first order condition is
d0ðeF ÞW =n þ ðaþ bÞjeaþb 1F  k ¼ 0: ð6Þ
In this way, we have that
27 Profits should really by multiplied by minfmax[0,1/2 þ (UF UG)/2A],1g but notice that since
minfmax[0,1/2 þ (UF UG)/2A],1g is a probability, it is always bigger than zero. Thus, it never affects
whether the constraint is binding or not.
@eF
@W =n
¼ d
0ðeF Þ
ðaþ bÞðaþ b 1Þjeaþb 2F þ d00ðeF ÞW =n
:
Since we know that if the decision is optimal ða þ bÞða þ b 1Þ jeaþb 2F þ
d00ðeF ÞW =n  0 (to guarantee the satisfaction of second order conditions), then if
d0(eF)  0, the effect of increasingW in eF is positive. We summarise this observation in:
Proposition 1. When the fringe wins the election, human capital is positively related to the
amount of natural resources.
The underlying intuition is simple. In order to have a chance to win the elections
the fringe maximises the voters’ utility but it is restricted by the resource con-
straint. This constraint becomes looser the higher the efficiency of the fringe in
managing natural resources. This, in turn, is a skill that depends positively on human
capital.
Things look very different if the incumbent government wins the election.
1.2. The Government Problem
The government maximises its own utility subject to the no-revolution constraint:
max
eG ;wG
ðW =n  wG  keG þ ajeaþbG Þ
min max 0; 1
2
þ U ½wG þ jð1 aÞe
aþb
G   UF
2A
( )
; 1
 !
subject to
U ½wG þ jð1 aÞeaþbG   U ½cðeGÞRðW =nÞ 
c
q
:
In order to derive some analytical results, we further assume that U(x) ¼ ln(x). Then
max
eG ;wG

W =n  wG  keG þ ajeaþbG
	
min max 0; 1
2
þ ln½wG þ jð1 aÞe
aþb
G   UF
2A
( )
; 1
 !
subject to
wG þ jð1 aÞeaþbG  cðeGÞRðW =nÞ exp 
c
q
 
:
We have to distinguish two cases:
(i) the no-revolution constraint does not bind at the optimum and
(ii) the no-revolution constraint binds at the optimum.
The next two Propositions treat the two different cases in turn.
Proposition 2. The human capital induced by the unconstrained solution to the government
problem is
e	G ¼
jðaþ bÞ
k
  1
1 a b
: ð7Þ
Therefore, if the government wins the election and revolution is no threat, human capital does not
depend on the exact level of natural resources.
Proof. See Technical Appendix
In other words, if revolution is no threat, the government will induce e	G . Any addi-
tional transfers to voters will be via the direct subsidy wG.
28 To understand this result
notice that the government trades off higher returns when in power with a higher
probability to stay in power. For this reason, the government wants to give the voters the
highest utility at the lowest possible cost. This is achieved by inducing the level of
human capital defined by (7) which corresponds to its socially efficient level, the one
that internalises the positive externality for society of individual human capital
investment.
If revolution is a threat, subsidising human capital accumulation has an additional
effect: it increases the skills of a future revolutionary government. This creates a
complication for the government. On the one hand subsidising human capital is good
for the government; it increases the efficiency of the economy and voters’ utility, which
is especially important since there is the competitive pressure from the fringe. On the
other hand, increasing the skills of revolutionaries makes revolution more attractive,
and this runs against the government’s interest. Therefore, when the pressure of
revolutionaries is sufficiently high, or the one from the fringe is sufficiently low, the
government prefers to lower human capital when natural resources increase. This is
summarised in the following:
Proposition 3. If revolution is a threat, human capital may decrease in natural resources. It
will certainly decrease if there is sufficient uncertainty in the electoral process (high A) or if
uneducated citizens are reasonably good at managing natural resources (high c( 0)) or if the
opposition is very weak (d(eF) low and with a low upper bound).
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
Notice that the Proof of Proposition 3 derives exact conditions (A.7 and A.9)
for high A or high c(0).29 These conditions are sufficient but not necessary for
@eG/@W/n < 0.
30
28 Notice that the way the model is set up, wG can be negative. Hence, if W/n were too small to induce e
	
G ,
the government would raise the missing money by taxing voters via wG. If for some reason transfers had to be
nonnegative, then if W/n were too small to induce e	G , the government would use all returns from natural
resources to subsidise education and human capital would increase for low levels of W/n until it reached e	G .
29 It is easy to see that both Conditions (A.7) and (A.9) are satisfied more easily for higher revolutionary
success probabilities q and lower revolutionary costs c. Moreover, returns to human capital enter Condition
(A.7). The higher these returns (higher a or higher j or lower k), the tighter is Condition (A.7).
30 If these conditions are violated, we cannot sign @eG/@W/n analytically but in all simulations we have
undertaken we still observed @eG /@W/n < 0 when our assumptions were violated.
1.3. When Does The Government Worry About Revolution?
Propositions 2 and 3 tell us that the variation of human capital with the amount of
natural resources depends critically on whether the no-revolution constraint binds.
Hence, we need to understand the conditions under which the no-revolution con-
straint is binding. We now explore this issue.
Rewriting the first order conditions for the unconstrained solution allows us to cal-
culate unconstrained wG.
0 ¼  1
2
þ ln½wG þ jð1 aÞe
aþb
G   UF
2A
( )
þ W =n  wG  jbe
aþb
G
2A½wG þ jð1 aÞeaþbG 
:
The solution is:
w	G ¼ exp


LambertW

W =n þ 1 aþ bð Þ½ je	aþbG

expA UF 1
	 A þ UF þ 1
jð1 aÞe	aþbG ;
ð8Þ
where LambertW(Æ) is the Lambert W function31 and e	G ¼ ½jða þ bÞ=k
1
1 a b. To
understand when revolution is a concern, we have to check whether w	G and e
	
G violate
the no-revolution constraint, i.e. we have to compare w	G with
NRðe	G Þ 
 ½cðe	G ÞRðW =nÞ exp 
c
q
 
 je	aþbG ð1 aÞ ð9Þ
where R(W/n) ¼ W/n þ j(1a)eR ¼ W/n þ j(1a)(aj/k)(aþb)/(1 a b). The uncon-
strained solution holds whenever w	G > NRðe	G Þ.
We are now in a position to perform a comparative statics analysis (using numerical
simulations where necessary) to get some insight about when revolution is a concern.
We will always vary the value ofW/n and some other exogenous variable simultaneously.
Similarly, the Figures we show depict the value of w	G and of NRðe	G Þ, as a function of W/
n and some other exogenous variable. Both w	G and NRðe	G Þ increase in W/n; while
NRðe	GÞ is a linear function of W/n, w	G is convex in W/n. We group these other
exogenous variables into four categories depending on their economic meaning. For
the simulations we use the functions32 c(e) ¼ 10 4 þ e2, and dðeÞ ¼ d^eaþb. The basic
parameters, which are then varied individually (along with W/n) to observe the
different comparative statics, are: ða; b;d^; k;A; c=q; jÞ ¼ ð0:5; 0:2; 0:15; 1; 1; 1; 2Þ.
(1) The function d(e) is a measure of institutional quality. Better political institutions
(higher d(e) functions) allow the fringe to offer a higher utility UF to voters.
Hence, the government has to react with a higher direct transfer w	G which
implies that the no-revolution constraint will bind less often. In other words,
the revolutionary threat vanishes with better institutions.
(2) The variables c/q and c(eG) determine the strength of the threat of revolution. The
larger is this threat, the more likely is the no-revolution constraint to bind:
NRðe	GÞ increases with those variables while w	G is unaffected. In other words, as
31 The Lambert W function, also called the Omega function or product log, is the inverse function of f(w)
w expw.
32 We tried other functional forms, in particular dðeÞ d^ , and the qualitative results in terms of com
parative statics are similar.
the citizens become better at managing natural resources (high c(eG) for
all eG), the no-revolution constraint becomes more relevant. Similarly, for low
values of c/q (the cost of revolution is low and/or the probability of success is
high) the no-revolution constraint will always bind. For sufficiently high
c/q revolution is never an issue; it is simply too costly or too unlikely to be
successful. For intermediate values of c/q the constraint binds for low values of
W/n, while for high values of W/n we get the unconstrained solution. Recall
that w	G is a convex function of W/n. More resources make the fringe a more
serious competitor. The government has to react with higher direct transfers
which make it less likely that the no-revolution constraint is violated. Figure 1
shows the impact of c/q on both w	G and of NRðe	GÞ and illustrates graphically
the previous discussion.
(3) The variables j, k, a and b determine the returns and costs of investment in human
capital.
(a) The effect of a change in j, which increases (linearly) the marginal return
to human capital, depends crucially on the function c(e). An increase in
j, leads to higher e	G and thus an increase in cðe	G Þ. Both the uncon-
strained transfer w	G and NRðe	GÞ increase with j (and with W/n). Whether
or not the latter increases more strongly, depends on c(e).
(i) For low c(e), the no-revolution constraint never binds. The man-
agement skills of revolutionaries are simply too low.
Fig. 1. Impact of c/q on wG and NR(eG)
(ii) Suppose c(e) is sufficiently large. For low j, the no-revolution con-
straint never binds. For high j the constraint binds. An increase in j
leads to higher e	R and e
	
G , which has an indirect effect on NRðe	G Þ by
increasing cðe	GÞ: the management skills of revolutionaries improve.
This additional effect becomes more important with a higher j, and
hence revolution becomes more likely. Figure 2 shows the impact of
j on both w	G and of NRðe	G Þ and illustrates the previous discussion
graphically.33
(b) The parameter k measures the individual’s marginal cost to acquire hu-
man capital. The effects of changing k are, thus, the reverse effects of
changing j (which, remember, is a proportionality constant on human
capital returns). More precisely:
(i) For low c(e) the no-revolution constraint never binds.
(ii) If c(e) is sufficiently large, the no-revolution constraint binds when
both k and W/n are sufficiently low and it does not bind if either k or
W/n are sufficiently high. Figure 3 shows the impact of k on both w	G
and of NRðe	G Þ.
Fig. 2. Impact of k on wG and NR(eG)
33 Figure 2 shows that there is an area of j in which for low W/n the no revolution constraint binds while it
does not for high W/n. The intuitions is the same as in the previous case (intermediate values of c/q) in that
more resources make the fringe a more serious competitor and therefore the unconstrained transfer is less
likely to violate the no revolution constraint.
(c) Theparameters a andbdetermine the returns to scale ofhumancapital.We
assume a þ b < 1, hence returns to scale will always be decreasing. Since
varying b leads to the same qualitative results than varying a, we will express
the whole discussion in terms of varying a. For low W/n, the no-revolution
constraint always binds. For high W/n, only the unconstrained solution
holds. For intermediate values of W/n, the constraint binds for high a but
not for low a. The intuition is as follows. Whether or not revolution is a
threat depends on how worried the government has to be about the fringe.
As before, a high (low) W/n makes the fringe a more (less) serious com-
petitor, hence revolution is less (more) likely to be a problem. For inter-
mediate values of W/n, an additional effect kicks in. Here, the fringe
dominates the threat of revolution for low a, leading to low government
skills of revolutionaries cðe	G Þ. As a increases, revolutionaries become more
effective both inmanaging natural resources and the production sector, so
revolution becomes the real threat. Figure 4 shows the impact of a on both
w	G and of NRðe	G Þ and illustrates the previous discussion graphically.
(4) The aggregate shock A to voters’ preferences measures the extent to which policies matter
for winning the elections. The bigger the shock, the less important are the
promised utilities to voter. For very low A, we always have the unconstrained
solution. When A increases, the constraint starts to bite for low W/n but not for
high W/n (which again makes the fringe a serious threat). For high A, the no-
Fig. 3. Impact of k on wG and NR(eG)
revolution constraint always holds. This happens because w	G decreases with A,
since promised utilities have a smaller effect on the probability of winning the
elections, while NRðe	G Þ is independent of A. Figure 5 shows the impact of A on
both w	G and of NRðe	G Þ and illustrates the previous discussion graphically.
1.4. Determining the Winner of the Elections
The probability that the government wins the election is directly related to UG  UF. To
gain some insight on how the probability to win an election changes with the amount of
natural resources, we will discuss the case when the no-revolution constraint does not
bind. From (8) we can conclude that
UG  UF ¼ LambertW W =n þ 1 aþ bð Þ½ jeaþbG
n o
expA UF 1
 
 A þ 1:
Since the LambertW function is increasing, we only have to look at the derivative of its
argument. Thus we have
sign
@ðUG  UF Þ
@ðW =nÞ ¼ sign exp
A UF 1 1 W =n þ ½1 ðaþ bÞjeaþbG  @UF@W =n
  
ð10Þ
¼ sign 1

W =n þ ½1 ðaþ bÞjeaþbG

dðeF Þ
dðeF ÞW =n  keF þ jeaþbF
 !
: ð11Þ
Fig. 4. Impact of a on wG and NR(eG)
Whether this sign is positive or negative, hence whether the probability that the
government wins the election is increasing or decreasing, generally depends on the
parameters of the model. However, a couple of things can be deduced from this
expression. For W/n ¼ 0 we know from (6) that34
eF ¼ ðaþ bÞjk
  1
1 a b
:
Clearly, if (a þ b)j/k is low enough, (11) is positive. On the other hand, for very
largeW/n, when the variation of eF is smaller than that of W/n, then (11) will asymptote
Fig. 5. Impact of A on wG and NR(eG)
34 Here we make use of the assumption that direct transfers w can be negative. If negative w were not
allowed, then for W/n 0 neither the fringe nor the government would subsidise human capital accumu
lation. Hence we would observe eR, the level of human capital after a revolution. In this case (11) would
simplify to
sign
@ðUG UF Þ
@ðW =nÞ sign 1
½1 ðaþ bÞjeaþbR dðeR Þ
keR þ jeaþbR
( )
sign 1
½1 ðaþ bÞjeaþbR dðeR Þ
ð1 aÞjeaþbR
( )
sign 1
½1 ðaþ bÞdðeR Þ
ð1 aÞ
 
> 0:
to zero. From this argument it is not clear whether it could ever be decreasing. To
confirm that in fact it can, we perform a numerical simulation using the same basic
parameter values and functional forms as in Sub-section 1.3. The result of this simu-
lation is shown in Figure 6. The Figure displays the two features we uncovered ana-
lytically and also shows that for sufficiently high W/n the sign is negative.
The fact that the derivative can be both positive and negative reflects that two eco-
nomic forces are at work. On the one hand, as resources increase, the government can
pay higher direct transfers wG, thus increasing its chances of winning. On the other
hand, the fringe can also offer better terms, especially through the channel of human
capital eF, which also enhances its probability of winning and makes the fringe a better
administrator of natural resources. While direct transfers enter in the utility of voters
linearly, the expressions depending on human capital are concave. Therefore, the
effect of higher direct transfers will dominate in the beginning since it hits the margin
directly from the beginning, whereas the effect of human capital needs more natural
resources to have the same marginal impact.
Clearly, by bounding the d(e) function one could ensure that (11) is never negative,
which seems to be the relevant case according to the empirical evidence. Recall that we
interpreted the d(e) function as a proxy for institutional quality. A low and bounded
d(e) corresponds to a country where institutions are weak. and the fringe cannot
manage natural resources as efficiently as the government even for high levels of
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Fig. 6. Impact of W/n on Probability of Winning Elections by Incumbent
education. In this case, finding natural resources increases the chances that the
incumbent government stays in power. Strong institutions make it less likely that nat-
ural resources will allow the incumbent to become more entrenched.
2. Empirical Evidence
Our theoretical model can capture the five empirical regularities outlined in the
Introduction. It tells us when natural resources lead to a revolution, namely in
countries with bad political institutions (Fact 5).35 It can explain when natural
resources are a blessing and when they are a curse (Fact 2) and it captures the
importance of the quality of institutions (Fact 3). While for the opposition’s policy
human capital is increasing in natural resources, the incumbent’s policy reaction to
human resources depends on the quality of institutions. When institutions are good,
political competition forces the incumbent to choose the subsidy for human capital
so that individuals internalise its positive spillovers on society. When institutions are
bad, the incumbent’s main worry is the revolutionary threat and he often prefers to
keep education low to minimise this threat. Hence, with bad institutions human
capital is lower if the incumbent wins the election. Moreover, the incumbent is
likely to win the elections if institutions are bad. A further result of our model is
that natural resources may be bad for political turnover, particularly in countries
with bad political institutions (Fact 4). If the majority of countries with natural
resources have bad institutions, we will observe that natural resources are negatively
correlated with growth on average (Fact 1: the curse).
Our model goes beyond these five regularities by specifying mechanisms that cause
these regularities. Hence our model delivers specific predictions which should be
confronted with the empirical evidence. While a full-fledged empirical analysis is
beyond the scope of this article, we present some evidence that is in line with our
model predictions.
2.1. Natural Resources, Institutional Quality and Human Capital
According to our theory the institutional quality of a country affects how human capital
changes with natural resources. For countries with bad institutions, there are two
reasons to expect a negative relationship between human capital and natural resources:
(i) The amount of natural resources and human capital is a decreasing function of
natural resources when the incumbent is in power.
(ii) The likelihood that the incumbent stays in power always increases in the amount
of natural resources.
For countries with good institutions, there are better chances for the opposition to
win the election, in which case human capital grows with natural resources. On the
other hand, if the incumbent is re-elected, there is no effect of natural resources on
35 Observe that in our model revolution never occurs in equilibrium against an incumbent. Nevertheless
our model can guide us about the possibility of revolution: obviously adding some noise would lead to
occasional violations of the no revolution constraint and it would result in a revolution. According to our
model this is more likely to happen in countries with weak institutions.
human capital. So on average we should expect a positive effect of natural resources on
human capital but this positive effect should be less pronounced than the negative
effect with bad institutions.
To provide some preliminary evidence we use the simplest method possible to test
this prediction, namely we split the sample into two groups: countries with bad insti-
tutions and countries with good institutions and then regress human capital on natural
resources and other controls.36 Our econometric model can be formulated as
Hi ¼ a0ri þ b0Zi þ ei if Ii  na1ri þ b1Zi þ ei if Ii > n

; ð12Þ
where Hi is human capital in country i, ri are natural resources in country i, Zi are
additional controls and Ii is a variable (ordered and categorical in our data)
denoting the quality of institutions in country i. Our theory predicts that a0 < 0 and
that a1 > 0.
2.1.1. Data
In our regression human capital will be measured by the average years of school in the
total population age 25 and over (see Barro and Lee, 2001). The additional controls are
the log of GDP (lgdp), the total fertility rate (births per woman) and the Gini coefficient
as a measure of inequality.37
We now turn to the more delicate data choice: the data for natural resources and the
measure for institutional quality. The data typically used in growth regressions and
which produces the natural resource curse is either some primary export variable (first
used by Sachs and Warner (1995)) or Gylfason and Zoega’s (2006) natural capital
share.38 However, these data typically include natural resources that are not owned by
the state. Even the World Bank’s Ores and Metals Exports’ variable is not adequate for
our purpose since it includes items such as crude fertilisers and scrap metal (de Soysa
and Neumayer, 2007). The data from fuel exports and non-fuel mineral exports are
also problematic since they count exported petroleum products that were exclusively
made from imported oil (c.f. Ross, 2006). We therefore opt for a new measure of
natural resource rents which is part of the World Bank’s Dataset on genuine savings,
also called adjusted net savings. In particular we use the log of total oil and gas rents.
Following de Soysa and Neumayer (2007) we argue that rents from production are a
36 An alternative approach used in an earlier version of this article (Cabrales and Hauk, 2007) is to regress
human capital on natural resources and the cross product of natural resources and institutional quality. Our
theory would predict a negative coefficient for natural resources by itself and a positive coefficient for the
cross product. The disadvantage with this approach is that it suffers from an endogeneity problem since
institutional quality enters the regression directly and might be endogenous to human capital. Lacking a
good instrument for institutional quality we prefer to split the sample, which allows us to side step the
endogeneity problem.
37 The data source for GDP and fertility are the World Development indicators while the Gini coefficient is
taken from the UNDP Human development reports at: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html
38 Gylfason and Zoega (2006) constructed this measure from World Bank Data. Natural capital is the sum
of subsoil wealth’, timber, non timber benefits of forests, cropland, pasture land and the opportunity cost of
protected areas. In turn, subsoil wealth is the present value of a constant stream of economic profits on
resource rents’ on various fuels and minerals; that is, gross profit on extraction less depreciation of capital
and normal return on capital.
relatively more comprehensive measure of the relative economic importance of natural
resources than exports for judging arguments about state capacity and the effect of the
quality of political institutions. It is exactly the rents generated by the natural resources
which might be stolen by politicians or weaken the political institutions.39
As a proxy for the quality of political institutions we use those indices of the World
Wide Governance indicators (WGI) that we believe capture our delta-function more
closely. Each index ranges from 2.5 to þ2.5 where positive numbers indicate a
higher quality.40 In particular we use regulatory quality, government effectiveness, control of
corruption and the average of these 3 indices. Regulatory quality, which captures the
perception of the ability of the government to implement sound policies, proxies our
d() function because a country with good regulation is likely to be one with a good
civil service: professional, unpoliticised and useful. In such a country, the political
turnover is less costly, as the experience of the incumbent is less likely to matter and
politicians can dedicate themselves simply to set priorities. That is a good approxi-
mation for a d() function with values close to 1, which implies a smaller advantage of
the incumbent, come election time. Government Effectiveness measures bureaucratic
quality and is an indicator of whether bureaucracies are autonomous and free from
political pressure and have an established mechanism for recruitment and training.
High government effectiveness translates into a high d() function since institutions
work independently of who is in power. Control of corruption measures corruption
within the political system. The index is low if people assume positions of power
through patronage rather than ability.
2.1.2. Results
Letting
diðnÞ ¼ 0 if Ii  n1 if Ii > n

our empirical model can be written
Hi ¼ a0ri þ b0Zi þ ða1  a0ÞdiðnÞri þ ðb1  b0ÞdiðnÞZi þ ei :
Following Hansen (2000) we first estimate the threshold value n by doing OLS
regressions with fixed values for n and then we choose the value of n whose regression
yields the minimum mean squared error.41 These regressions are for the year 2000.42
Then the estimates for a^i and b^i are the OLS estimates corresponding to the chosen n^:
39 Several authors (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Brunnschweiler, 2008) have argued that mineral
reserves could be an exogenous measure of resource abundance. Using a measure of subsoil wealth devel
oped by the World Bank these authors show that the natural resource curse disappears: natural resources
always enhance growth. However, as Torvik (2009) points out these measures are not really exogenous and
likely to be biased against the resource curse: countries with good institutions are likely to have explored and
found more of their resources than countries with bad institutions, hence well functioning countries will be
measured as more resource abundant than countries with bad institutions.
40 For an exact definition of what enters in each index see Appendix B.4 in Kaufmann et al. (2009). The
data can be downloaded at http://www.govindicators.org
41 We first discretise in steps of size 0.1. Then, we check that the mean square error (MSE) is basically
concave and finally we discretise more finely around the best values of the MSE until we find the best possible
partition given our finite number of countries.
42 We have done several robustness checks for different years all leading to similar results.
Due to data availability we have 59 countries in our regression. Our classification of
countries into countries with good institutions and bad institutions varies slightly
depending on the index of institutional quality used.43 Table 1 reports 4 different
regressions for 4 different classification systems. t - values are given in parenthesis.
* means significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% .44 Average is
the average of control of corruption (control corr), government effectiveness (G effective)
and regulatory quality (req quality).
In all four regressions, resource rents are significantly negative when institutions are
bad and positive when institutions are good, as predicted by our theory. The results for
average and control corr coincide because the best sample split coincides for both variables.
Table 1
OLS Results
log oilgasrent log GDP fertility gini constant
control corr < 0.6 0.2567558***
(t : 2.75)
2.432888***
(t :3.19)
0.7009585**
(t : 2.55)
0.0144494
(t : 0.50)
6.146173*
(t :1.88)
control corr > 0.6 0.2686322***
(t :2.98)
0.3345005
(t : 0.23)
2.332274***
(t :3.01)
0.1182178**
(t : 2.03)
5.321225
(t :0.87)
G effective < 0.6 0.2295497**
(t : 2.27)
1.846915**
(t :2.16)
0.744716***
(t : 2.6)
0.0096643
(t : 0.30)
7.198659**
(t :2.10)
G effective > 0.6 0.1751051*
(t :1.87)
0.9811655
(t :1.02)
0.6156938
(t :0.97)
0.0615654
(t : 1.25)
2.746324
(t :0.61)
reg quality < 0.7 0.2556269***
(t : 2.66)
2.425444***
(t :3.1)
0.7003917**
(t :2.51)
0.0140163
(t : 0.47)
6.124106*
(t :1.84)
reg quality > 0.7 0.2795367***
(t :3.22)
0.8152988
(t : 0.68)
2.398259***
(t :3.18)
0.1344277***
(t : 2.63)
7.601011
(t :1.58)
average < 0.65 0.2567558***
(t : 2.75)
2.432888***
(t :3.19)
0.7009585**
(t : 2.55)
0.0144494
(t : 0.50)
6.146173*
(t :1.88)
average > 0.65 0.2686322***
(t :2.98)
0.3345005
(t : 0.23)
2.332274***
(t :3.01)
0.1182178**
(t : 2.03)
5.321225
(t :0.87)
Note. t values shown in parenthesis
43 The countries are grouped as follows. We will start with the division for average 0.65 and then point
out the changes.
39 countries in our sample are qualified as having bad institutions using average < 0.65, namely Algeria,
Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, South
Africa, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela.
20 countries are classified as having good institutions (average > 0.65), namely: Australia, Austria, Canada,
Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States.
For control corruption < 0.6 the classification (and hence the result) does not change.
For government effectiveness < 0.6 no country moves to the group with bad institutions but the Czech Republic,
Korea, Malaysia, Poland and South Africa move to the group with good institutions.
When looking at regulatory quality < 0.65 Slovenia move to the group with bad institutions but the
Czech Republic moves to the group with good institutions.
44 As Hansen (2000) notes, the standard error for a^i and b^i in the OLS with the estimated n^ are asymp
totically valid but may underrepresent true sampling variance in small samples. He suggests using as confi
dence intervals the union of the confidence intervals for all the values of n^ within its own 95% confidence
interval. Given that the coefficient for our natural resources variable (log oilgasrent) is significant even for
values of n rather far away from our chosen estimate, the results under that alternative procedure would still
yield a significant coefficient.
Post regression estimates strongly reject the hypotheses
(i) that the resource rents parameters in the different groups are jointly zero and
(ii) that they are equal to each other at significance levels always less than 2%.
This means that natural resources matter and that their effect differs depending
whether institutions are good or bad. Our regressions suggest that in countries with
good institutions natural resources enhance education. In countries with bad institu-
tions natural resources are detrimental to education.
Ourmodel predicts that when the government is very likely to win the election, natural
resources are bad for human capital accumulation. This situation happens for bad
democratic institutions or in non-democratic regimes. Andersen and Silje (2008) provide
additional indirect evidence for this prediction. Revisiting the seminal growth analysis
of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), they find that the resource curse is explained by the
poor performance of resource abundant presidential and non-democratic regimes –
there is no resource curse in democracies with a parliamentary form of government.
2.2. Natural Resources Harm Political Turnover
It is widely thought that resource wealth, especially oil, is a curse for democracy (Ross,
2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Tsui, 2009). These studies report a negative
statistical relationship between different measures of resource abundance and
democracy. Tsui (2009) exploits variation in the timing and size of oil discoveries to
identify the impact of oil wealth on democracy and finds that discovering oil signifi-
cantly decreases a country’s 30-year change in democracy, as measured by the Polity
Index and the negative impact of oil discovery is bigger the less democratic the country
was before it found oil. Aslaksen (2009) shows that levels of oil systematically predict
both levels and changes in democracy in a sample of up to 156 countries between 1972
and 2002. Ross (2001) finds that the negative impact of oil on democracy is stronger in
oil-poor countries than in oil-rich countries prior to the new discovery. These studies
can be seen as indirect evidence for our model. Our model predicts that oil harms
democracy by making political turnover less likely, especially in countries with bad
institutions. Moreover, the incumbent’s probability to win the elections increases more
sharply for initial resource discoveries. Hence, a serious test of our model would
require to study re-election probabilities with respect to natural resources and insti-
tutional qualities. We leave a careful study of this implication for future research.
However, we report two empirical and two case studies and that are in line with our
model prediction.
On the empirical side Omgba (2009) and Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2010) use a
survival model to study the link between oil and duration in office. Both studies find a
robust positive relationship between these variables. Omgba (2009) looks at different
political regimes but concentrates on 26 North and Sub-Saharan African oil-producing
countries in the period 1958–2000 and analyses 101 occupancies of power and their
link to oil rents. Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2010) study the link between oil and the
duration of dictatorship with a dataset on 106 dictators. Their empirical findings
indicate that dictators in countries which are relatively better endowed in terms of
oil stay longer in office: in particular, a higher level of oil production increases the
log-time to failure for the considered dictators. These empirical findings are clearly
consistent with our theory. So are the following case studies.
The first case study, by Esanov et al. (2004), examines the transition experience of
former communist countries. The article analyses the progress made in the energy-
rich states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Azerbaijan, Ka-
zakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (AKTU for short) in which the president
has direct control over key natural resources and contrasts their development to
that in the resource-poor countries at the CIS periphery. It is shown that progress in
key reforms has lagged behind in the energy-rich states. This might be linked to
political turnover during the early transition period. The authors point out that
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan all have heads of state who
were high communist officials during Soviet times. In the latter three countries
these heads of state already stood at the helm of their country at the time of
independence. In contrast, the western CIS (and eastern Europe) were by and large
characterised by a much higher degree of government turnover during the initial
years of transition.
A second case study looks at Sub-Saharan Africa. Lam and Wantchekon (2002) argue
that resource abundance can potentially explain Bratton’s (1998) findings about the
second period elections in 16 Sub-Saharan African Countries in 1995–7 following the
founding elections (first competitive multiparty elections) that took place in the period
from 1989 to 1994. Consistently with our theory that natural resources make the
incumbent more entrenched by increasing his win probabilities, Bratton (1998) ob-
serves a decline in the rate of leadership alternation (37% to 6.6%) and an increase in
the mean of winner’s vote share (61.4% to 69.1% for presidential elections and 62.7%
to 72.0% in parliamentary elections).
2.3. The Revolutionary Threat Vanishes with Good Institutions
Our model predicts that revolutions or civil war linked to natural resources are more
likely to occur in countries with bad institutions. The empirical literature of the link
between civil war and natural resources is huge and controversial. While it is beyond
doubt that there is a statistical relationship between civil war and natural resources, the
causal direction is under dispute and the empirical literature has also failed to establish
the causal mechanism that links mineral wealth to war. There are many competing
theories: mineral wealth could foster conflict by funding rebel groups (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004), by weakening state institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Snyder and
Bhavnani, 2005) and by making the state a more attractive target for rebels (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003), to name just a few; see Ross (2006) for more details. Our model adds yet
another theory: the possibility of political protest acts as a constraint on the greed of
politicians but this constraint will only be relevant if institutions do not already fulfil
this role. While we are not aware of any empirical study testing this theory, a simple
look at countries that have suffered wars related to natural resources reveals that these
countries typically score badly in institutional quality. Political (in)stability, which
measures the threat of political unrest and the potential use of violence is often even
seen as part of the definition of institutional quality: for instance, it is one of the World
Wide Government Indicators suggested by Kaufmann et al. (2009).
3. Conclusion
In this article we have presented a formal political-economy analysis of the impact of
natural resources on human capital accumulation. In our model, citizens exert control
over politicians via an election and can always initiate a revolution if they are dissatisfied
with the proposed policies. Since it is a well-documented fact that natural resources
have led to civil unrest, it is important to incorporate this possibility into the model.45
To our knowledge this is the first article to allow simultaneously for political compe-
tition, elections and revolution.46 We propose to model the possibility of revolution by
introducing a new constraint into the model, which we denote the no revolution
constraint. Under this constraint politicians select their policies so that there are no
sufficiently large sectors of the population who want to block those policies by starting a
revolution. In the context of natural resources, this constraint can be taken literally.
However, we would like to emphasise that this constraint might be introduced in many
other models: the economic literature is full of policy recommendations which no sane
politician has dared to implement even if a majority of the population would benefit
from them. This sounds contrary to both economic and political theory but we argue
that there are good practical reasons for the outcome that the models overlook.
These policy recommendations arise in models where the policy resulting from the
voting mechanism (e.g., the policy preferred by the median voter) would harm a sizable
proportion of the population. Such policies are not implemented because the sector
that would be harmed has pressure instruments on top of their votes to block them and
these pressure instruments can be modelled by the no-revolution constraint.47 Hence,
the importance of our proposed modelling innovation lies far beyond the topic
studied.
In terms of the topic we study, our contribution is to incorporate the five empirical
facts on natural resources presented in the introduction simultaneously. We do so by
linking natural resources to education which is an established engine for growth. These
empirical facts were stated in terms of growth, so we give some evidence that they also
hold if we use education. In particular, we test our model prediction that the quality of
45 There is a growing theoretical literature relating power struggles to natural resources, however in this
literature people either have no democratic control over rulers (e.g. Olsson (2007) who sets up a predator
prey model in which rebels choose between peaceful production and predation on natural resources con
trolled by the ruler; or Wick (2008) using a Stackelberg model with limited endowments), or it is the political
elite which is initiating the revolution (Aslaksen and Torvik, 2006; Caselli, 2006).
46 Introducing revolution in political economy models is not an innovation per se. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001) explain the extension of the franchise’ in precisely this way. But notice that in their work, revolution is
a threat from citizens excluded’ from the vote, who thus have no alternative. In our work, revolution’ is an
added tool for all citizens, not an alternative when there is not a chance to vote. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) do include the possibility of revolting in democracy. However, this possibility does not operate as a
constraint for the government. It is simply a binary choice for the poor (already the median voter and thus the
tax setters in the democracy). The article closest to ours is Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) who study
electoral competition under the threat of political unrest. As in our model the decision whether to respond
with riots (disruptive interference) is made after elections have taken place and the possibility of riots affects
the platform choice of parties.
47 One example of such a policy recommendation is the abolition of capital taxes. Lucas (1990) has shown
that the optimal capital tax is zero. It has also been shown that the representative consumer would vote for a
capital tax of zero. Even in a model with heterogeneous agents (Garcia Mila`et al., 2010) the median voter is
likely to vote in favour of abolishing capital taxes. This, however, can harm as much as a third of the
population. This part of the population would probably go to great lengths in order to avoid the zero capital
tax.
institutions is decisive whether natural resources are a blessing or a curse in terms of
human capital accumulation in cross-country regressions.
Some authors have suggested that the size of a country matters for the effect of
natural resources. This is captured in our model, where country size is measured by n.
Increasing n has the same effect as decreasing natural resources W.
In our model, the income of the government stems only from natural resources. In a
more complete model the government could also receive income by taxing productive
activity. This is one of the extensions we would like to study in the future. The existence
of productive activity has an effect on the incentives of politicians to encourage human
capital accumulation: better education should enhance productive activity, which in
turn enables the government to extract more taxes. But better education also
strengthens the opposition and the ability of citizens to engage in a successful
revolution. We expect that the incumbent government will prefer not to enhance
education, since education weakens its political position and it is easier for them to
increase their income from natural resources than by taxing productive activity. Natural
resources are easily appropriated by corrupt politicians.
Some unnatural’ resources, like foreign aid, are also easy to appropriate. Is there a
link between natural resources and foreign aid? Can our model make predictions about
the effects foreign aid might have on education or growth? The answer is yes. Once
foreign aid is granted, it is very difficult for international institutions to avoid that
politicians steal it. Empirical evidence suggests that only a small percentage of the aid
actually reaches its desired objective. In Uganda only 13% of foreign aid granted for
education in 1991–1995 actually reached primary schools (Reinikka and Svensson,
2004). The evidence for other African countries is similar. As with natural resources the
quality of institutions is crucial in limiting stealing from foreign aid. But similarly
to natural resources, foreign aid tends to be detrimental to democracy: studying 108
recipient countries of foreign aid in the period 1960 to 1999 Djankov et al. (2005) find a
negative effect of foreign aid on democracy which ismuch bigger than the negative effect
of natural resources. Like natural resources foreign aid can be the cause of civil war and
revolution.48
Given these empirical similarities between the effects of natural resources and for-
eign aid, we can use our model to make predictions about when foreign aid is a blessing
and when it is a curse. In countries with good institutions, foreign aid will enhance
growth, while the opposite will happen in countries with bad institutions. Typically it is
the latter group of countries that receives foreign aid. Our model recommends that
only poor countries that have good institutions should be granted foreign aid.
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
A. Proofs.
Please note: The RES and Wiley-Blackwell are not responsible for the content or
functionality of any supporting materials supplied by the authors. Any queries (other
than missing material) should be directed to the authors of the article.
48 Maren (1997) provides evidence that the cause of the civil war in Somalia was the control over foreign
aid.
Appendix
B: The Effect of Past Human Capital
In this Appendix we use a Mincerian framework to derive our functional form for how past
human capital enters a worker’s productivity level. To simplify notation we abstract from average
level of human capital. We assume that the human capital H of a worker can be expressed as:
H ¼ expðYears of educationÞa
lnH ¼ aðYears of educationÞ:
This functional form is justified because log wage (which is the measure of human capital) is
found empirically to be a linear function of the years of education; see e.g. Heckman et al. (2008)
following a tradition since, at least, Mincer (1974). With this in mind, we write the programme of
the voter as:
max
E
U w þ k expðE þ EP Þa ðk pÞ expðEÞ½ :
To see that we can actually write this as our problem with the e written in multiplicative form,
we first digress to show that the optimal value in exp (E) is equivalent to the one of e ¼ exp (E).
Let maxE F ½expðEÞ; the FOC is F 0½expðEÞ expðEÞ ¼ 0: Let expðeÞ ¼ E maxe F ðeÞ: The FOC is
F 0ðeÞ ¼ 0: So the difference is that with the problem defined with respect to E we have F 0ðeÞe ¼ 0:
Thus the only thing we miss is an equilibrium in e ¼ 0, which would not be stable anyway.
Now maxE U w þ k expðE þ EP Þa ðk pÞ expðEÞ½  can then be written by the previous
argument as
max
e
U ½w þ keaeaP ðk pÞe
max
e
U w þ jea ðk pÞe½ :
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